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ARTICLES

Coming To The Nuisance: Nor Shall
Private Property Be Taken Without..
JOHN DWIGHT INGRAM*
I.

INTRODUCTION

If the natural growth of an urban area brings new homeowners
into what was formerly a rural, agricultural area, must a pig farmer
close down his piggery to accommodate the new residents?' If a largescale developer plants a brand new community out in the middle of
nowhere, must a neighboring, pre-existing cattle feeding operation yield
to the newcomers? 2 Or if a homeowner is using solar energy to heat
his house, must his neighbor build in a manner which avoids cutting
off the flow of sunlight to the solar collectors? 3
While these or similar questions have been with us for many years,
they have increased in importance as our social and economic objectives and philosophies have changed. Our cities are spreading more
and more into surrounding countryside. New communities are springing
up almost overnight in the sunbelt and other regions of rapid growth.
We must expect to be faced with a continuing flow of difficult questions raised by conflicts over the use of land.'
We have seen our country evolve from a time when a landowner
had the right to use his property in almost any way he wished, to
a more recent willingness of society to regulate the use of land for
the general welfare. We have also witnessed a change from a strong
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; A.B., Harvard University; J.D., The John Marshall Law School.The author gratefully acknowledges the
help of his very capable Research Assistants: Sandra Freeman Kravitt, Lynne R.

Ostfeld, and Erie Karr. Both Ms. Kravitt and Ms. Ostfeld were selected as Illinois
Bar Foundation Research Fellows.
1. See, e.g., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178,
494 P.2d 700 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).

4. See generally, Note, Plaintiff Required to Indemnify Defendant for Losses

Resulting From Permanent Injunction in a Nuisance Case: Spur Industries Inc. v.
Del E. Webb Development Co., 1973 UTAH L. REV. 55.
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desire that nothing be done to restrict or impede land development
to a growing view that other societal interests may outweigh the need
for easy and rapid development of land.'
Since our rules of law, both common law and statutes, are usually
responsive to the needs and attitudes of our society, it is helpful to
examine society's goals and outlooks, past and present, before predicting and suggesting the guidelines and principles which will govern
our future activities concerning the use and enjoyment of our own
property and that of our neighbors.
II.

WHAT

Is A

"NUISANCE"?

Over the centuries, the right of a person to use and enjoy his
property has been protected and limited by the law of nuisance. 6 While
the concept of nuisance does not lend itself to an exact or simple
definition, in its broadest sense it includes any act or omission which
annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, health or safety of a person, or in any way renders him insecure in the use and enjoyment
of his property. 7 A nuisance is generally a continuing act or condition, but does not involve an actual physical invasion of property.'
Nuisances are of many and varied kinds, such as noxious gases 9 or
unpleasant odors,'" smoke or dust," vibration,' 2 the storage of explosives or the maintenance of other dangerous conditions,'" noise,"'
water pollution," excessive light,' 6 maintaining a house of prostitution"
or undertaking establishment," and blocking access to the sun.' 9

5. See Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
6. For an early English case, see William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816
(K.B. 1611). For an early American case, see Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky.
(I Bush) 139, 89 Am. Dec. 616 (1866).
7. See Summers v. Acme Flour Mills Co., 263 P.2d 515, 517 (Okla. 1953).

8. As distinguished from trespass, which is based on injury to a landowner's

right of exclusive possession of land. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,

594-96 (4th ed. 1971).
9. Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959) (en banc).
10. Steifer v. City of Kansas City, 175 Kan. 794, 267 P.2d 474 (1954).
11. Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 154 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1967).
12. Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944).

13. See Denney v. United States, 185 F.2d 108, 110-11 (10th Cir. 1960).
14. See Louisville Ref. Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1960).

15. See Rose v. Standard Oil Co., 56 R.I. 272, 185 A. 251 (1936).

16. The Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 A. 748 (1923).
17. Seifert v. Dillon, 83 Neb. 322, 119 N.W. 686 (1909).

18. Howard v. Etchieson, 228 Ark. 809, 310 S.W.2d 473 (1958).
19. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d
357 (Fla. App. 1959).
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A nuisance may be either private (an injury to one or more particular people) or public (an injury to the public generally) which endangers the public welfare, health, safety or morals. An individual,
however, may have a private right of action where a public nuisance
is especially injurious to him and causes him a different kind or greater
amount of damage than it causes to the public in general.
Nuisance law attempts to balance the right of landowners to use
land as they see fit against the duty to abstain from using land in
a way that injures the legal rights of a neighbor.20 Some interference
with another's use and enjoyment of property is tolerated; liability
for nuisance is found only when the interference is unreasonable2 '
and the harm caused is substantial.22 In determining whether an interference is unreasonable, courts must balance the gravity of the harm
against the utility of the conduct causing the harm. Factors to be
considered in this balancing process include the extent of the harm,
the suitability of the location to the competing uses, the relative ability
of the parties to avoid the harm, the existence of malice, the relative
social utility of the competing uses, and whether the interference
predated the competing use. 3
III.

REMEDIES FOR NUISANCE

Traditionally, there are two possible remedies available in a
nuisance action: damages at law, and equitable relief by injunction.
Ordinarily, if the defendant's activity is found to be a nuisance, plaintiffs can recover damages. 2 ' Injunctive relief is granted only upon a
showing that the nuisance not only exists but also that damages at
law are an inadequate remedy." In some cases, injunctive relief involves the total termination of defendant's operation or activity; 6 in
others, it requires him only to modify or limit his activities suffi20. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752, 758-59 (1947).
See also Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 114 So. 2d at 359.
21. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380,
382 (1952).
22. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752, 760-61 (1947).
See also Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep. 567, 572 (1876) (held use
must produce 'tangible or appreciable injury which renders enjoyment 'uncomfortable or inconvenient'.)
23. See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2D NUISANCES § 23 (1971 & Supp. 1984).
24. Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557, 563 (Iowa 1972); Gilbert
v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448, 2 Brown 158 (1871); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,
26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (1970).
25. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep. 567, 576-77 (1876).
26. Pendoley v. Ferriera, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963). See also Eaton
v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P.2d 678, 682 (1933).
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ciently to avoid any further interference with the plaintiff's use and
enjoyment of his property. 7
In many cases the granting of an injunction will cause a severe
loss to the defendant, especially if he will be forced to close down,28
and his burden may far outweigh the resulting benefit to the plaintiff.29
In such cases, many courts weigh the equities between the parties,
as well as the public interest, and as a result may deny injunctive
relief.3" If injunctive relief is denied, the court may award the plaintiff permanent damages to compensate for the interference with his
property rights, 3 or may deny any relief at all.32 In determining
whether damages should be awarded, the primary consideration is
whether, under the circumstances, the harm should be suffered by
the plaintiff without compensation. As a general rule, unless the court
determines that the cost of compensating the plaintiff will force the
defendant to discontinue his operation,33 the defendant will be ordered
to compensate the plaintiff for his injury, even though the utility of
the defendant's operation outweighs the harm done to the plaintiff. '
IV.

COMING

To

THE NUISANCE

A defendant frequently will defend his use as being reasonable

27. McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apts., Ltd., 25 Ariz. App. 312, 543 P.2d 150,
152 (1975) (discontinue rock concerts at shopping center); Stevens v. Rockport Granite
Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371, 375 (1914) (reduce noise from granite quarry);
Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer Co., 264 Ore. 557, 505
P.2d 919, 921-22 (1973) (reduce number of animals in cattle feedlot and stop runoff
of sewage).
28. E.g., Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974)
(cement plant).
29. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 872 (1970)
(damage to plaintiff's property relatively insignificant when viewed in light of the
value of defendant's $45,000,000.00 operation).
30. Id. One alternative solution is to enjoin continuance of defendant's operation, but require plaintiff to compensate defendant for the cost of closing down
or moving. Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700
(1972). See also infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text. Another alternative is
to defer the effective date of the injunction, thus allowing defendant an opportunity
to eliminate the nuisance, Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, or to move
to a new location, Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
31. Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870.
32. Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 15 Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942)
(most of town was built because of defendant's cement plant; plaintiff knew there
would be some discomfort-dust, noise, etc.-when he bought his house; to allow
damages might destroy defendant's business, as cost of dust-catching machinery would
be prohibitive).
33. See id.

34. Boomer, 26 N.Y.S2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870.
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by contending that the plaintiff came to the area after the defendant
had put his property to its present use. The defendant's contention
is that because he was putting his property to its present "offensive"
use before the plaintiff moved into the vicinity, the plaintiff cannot
now complain that the defendant's use is a nuisance.
The early common law gave priority rights to those who were
there first.
If my neighbour makes a tan-yard, so as to annoy and render less
salubrious the air of my house or gardens, the law will furnish me
with a remedy [the nuisance coming to the plaintiff]; but if he is
first in possession of the air, and I fix my habitation near him, the
nuisance is of my own seeking, and must continue [the plaintiff coming to the nuisance]. 35
The doctrine of "coming to the nuisance" has its roots in the general
ancient maxim of volenti non fit injuria (no legal wrong is done to
him who consents). The person coming to the nuisance was held
to impliedly consent to the nuisance by his voluntary choice of
establishing a residence or business in the neighborhood of a preex36
isting producer of some offensive condition.
While most courts today do not treat "coming to the nuisance"
as a complete defense," many do consider it as one of the factors
to be weighed. 38 However, before considering that factor, one must
first discuss the tests which courts apply in determining whether the
defendant's activities or operations constitute a nuisance.
Factors Considered
Most courts, in determining whether the defendant's activities constitute a nuisance as to the plaintiff, will look first to see what is
the "natural" use of the area involved. As the court said in Gilbert
v. Showerman,"9 "a party cannot justly call upon the law to make
that place suitable for his residence which was not so when he selected
it.""0 If people choose to live in a predominantly agricultural area,
"remote from urban development", they cannot "complain that the
35.

2

W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 402-03 (17th

ed. 1830).
36. Oetjen v. Goff Kirby Co., 38 ABs. 117, 121, 49 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ohio App.

1942).

37. See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
39. 23 Mich. 448 (1871).
40. Id. at 455 (defendant ran flour mill; most buildings in area used for business
and manufacturing; most families had moved away).
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agricultural pursuits carried on in the area depreciate the value of
their homes"' So too if a person elects "to live in a location that
is already occupied by business or industry which fouls the air with
smoke, gas, soot or other impurities". 4" "A person who prefers the
advantages of community life must expect to experience some of the
resulting inconveniences. Residents of industrial centers must endure
without redress a certain amount of annoyance and discomfiture which
'
is incident to life in such a locality." 43
The corollary of this is that agriculture and industry should not
be protected if they seek to invade an area whose natural use is
residential. 4" Homeowners have a right to expect reasonable peace and
quiet enjoyment of their land and should not be subjected to noise,
"5
loudspeakers at
dust, and other disturbances from cement plants,
"'
"6
an area which
in
settled
have
if
they
outdoor theaters, and the like,
the
determining
is naturally suited to residential living. Obviously,

"natural" use of an area is not an exact science, and there is considerable room for weighing of equities in this determination.
Foreseeability

Courts have generally been unsympathetic to plaintiffs who choose
to live in an area into which industry is likely to expand. For exam41. Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 525, 331 P.2d 539, 548 (1958)
(defendant's property had been used for cattle feeding for many years; area was
six miles beyond city limits, and three miles beyond county zoning. But see Spur
Industries, 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (retirement community built on farm
land fifteen miles beyond urban area); Hall v. Budde, 293 Ky. 436, 169 S.W.2d 33
(1943) (houses built near hog farm in semi-rural, sparsely settled area).
42. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, -, 109 N.W.2d
695, 699 (1961) (citing Mahlstadt v. City of Indianola, 251 Iowa 222, 100 N.W.2d
189 (1959)) (plaintiff began building houses next to city dump, which had been established there in an agricultural area over thirty years before). Of course, even in an
industrial district, there are limits on how much one must tolerate. See Lee v. Florida
Pub. Util. Co., 145 So.2d 299 (Fla. App. 1962) (defendant's electrical generating plant
produced fumes, loud noise, and heavy vibration).
43. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 40, 258 N.Y.S. 229,
232 (1932) (defendant's coke ovens were operating in an industrial area, along a
river, with seven railroads running through the area). See also Oetjen v. Goff Kirby
Co., 38 ABs. 117, 121, 49 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ohio App. 1942) (plaintiff "should have
reasonably anticipated the injury of which he complains").
44. Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 154 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1967).
45. Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974)
(dust from cement plant built near residential area just outside city).
46. Guarina v. Bogart, 407 Pa. 307, 309, 180 A.2d 557, 559 (1962). The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania stated that people who live in rural residential areas have
"possibly a greater right to peace and tranquility than one who abides in the . ..
city." Id. at 312, 180 A.2d at 560.
47. E.g., Daugherty v. Ashton Feed & Grain Co., Inc., 208 Neb. 159, 303
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pie, in Gau v. Ley," plaintiff moved into an area near a viaduct
used by two railroads. The area was gradually changing to business
and manufacturing use. The court said that "it was not reasonable

to presume that plaintiffs ... could [not] have foreseen that in [a]
the march of business would sooner or
large and growing city ....
later follow the line of these railroads and convert the adjacent...
land into business uses". 49 Even though the residences were there first,
the residents should have foreseen that the area was "peculiarly
adapted" to business and industrial use." °
On the other hand, courts have usually been willing to protect
new homeowners who follow the growth of a city into a natural area
of expansion. 5 Often, this means that an operation which was not
offensive to anyone while the area was rural or unsettled must relocate
because it constitutes a nuisance to new residents. 52 Courts have indicated that the recognition of a "grandfather right" would jeopardize
or preclude the orderly growth and development of our cities and

towns. 3 As the court said in Wier's Appeal,5 4 "[a]s the city expands
such nuisances should be removed to the vacant grounds beyond the
immediate neighborhood of the residences of the citizens. This, public
policy, as well as the health and comfort of the population of the
city, demand.""
N.W.2d 64 (1981) (noise from fans in grain elevator in small rural community).
48. 38 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 235 (1916).
49. Id. at 239.
50. Id. Accord, Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 258 N.Y.S.
229 (1932) (low land on the river with seven railroads running through it).
51. Cain v. Roggero, 28 De. Ch. 131, 38 A.2d 735 (1944). See also Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 228, 257 N.E.2d 871, 876 (1970) (Jansen,
Judge, dissenting).
52. Cain v. Roggero, 28 Del. Ch. 131, 38 A.2d 735 (1944) (mushroom grower
stored manure; when he started, most of the area was open fields, with a few houses
up the road a way); Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. 616 (1866) (pens for
livestock, some distance out of city, population 500; city, now 20,000, grew out to
defendant); Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963) (piggery
in rural area which became predominantly residential); Ensign v. Walls, 323 Mich.
49, 34 N.W.2d 549 (1948) (dog kennel; city grew out to it); Mahone et al. v. Autry
et al., 55 N.M. 111, 229 P.2d 623 (1951) (riding academy and stables; area became
largely residential).
53. City of Lyons v. Betts, 184 Neb. 746, 171 N.W.2d 792 (1969); Hadacheck
v. City of Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
54. 74 Pa. 230 (1873).
55. Id. at 241. Accord, Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915)
(to permit a "vested interest . . . [to] be asserted . . .because of conditions once
obtaining ... would preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive
conditions. There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the
way they must yield to the good of the community"); People v. Detroit White Lead
Works, 82 Mich. 471, 477-78, 46 N.W. 735, 737 (1890) ("Wherever such a business
becomes a nuisance, it must give way to the rights of the public, and the owners
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Where, however, the arrival of new homeowners was not foreseeable to the one charged with maintaining a nuisance, there is much
less reason to require the senior occupant to leave the area or modify
his operations. There is a great difference between locating a cattle
feedlot near the outskirts of a city (where the city will probably grow
toward the feedlot) and locating a feedlot in an open agricultural area
many miles from the city, only to have a developer subsequently create
a brand new retirement community with thousands of residents on
the land adjoining the feedlot." Here, it is the developer and his new
homeowners who could best foresee the land use conflict, rather than
the feedlot operator, who had no indication of a future conflict at
the time he started his business."
V.

Is

"COMING

To

THE NUISANCE"

A DEFENSE?

The early common law "coming to the nuisance" rule, as stated
in the leading case of Rex v. Cross,5" was that when a noxious trade
was established in a place remote from habitations, those who subsequently acquired property in the vicinity were barred from obtaining
either damages or an injunction, having assumed the risk of the
nuisance by purchasing property with knowledge of the conditions.
Although a few American courts apparently still follow Rex v. Cross,59
the overwhelming majority have rejected the doctrine, and declared
that "coming to the nuisance" is not a complete defense. 6 There
thereof must either devise some means to avoid the nuisance or must remove or
cease the business.").
56. Spur Industries, 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
57. Id. at 185-86, 494 P.2d at 706-07. While the court in Spur would have
favored the feedlot operator over the developer, the public health of the residents
proved decisive. The feedlot operator was required to move, but the developer was
required to compensate Spur for its loss.
58. 2 C. & P. 483, 172 Eng. Rep. 219 (1826).

59. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
60. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brick yard in area annexed
to city); City of Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W.
724 (1922) (hide and fur business near center of growing city); Lawrence v. Eastern

Air Lines, 81 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1955) (diversion of natural flow of water); Laflin &
Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 131 Ill.322, 23 N.E. 389 (1890) (powder magazine
near expanding city); C. Rice Packing Co. v. Ballinger, 311 Ky. 38, 223 S.W.2d

356 (1949) (slaughter house; area became residential); Curry v. Farmers Livestock

Market, 343 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. App. 1961) (barn and livestock market in mixed com-

mercial and residential area); Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142
(1963) (piggery in area which changed from rural to residential); People v. Detroit
White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 46 N.W. 735 (1890) (factory; area became residential); Forbes v. City of Durant, 209 Miss. 246, 46 So.2d 551 (1950) (broken city
sewer on outskirts of town); City of Lyons v. Betts, 184 Neb. 746, 171 N.W.2d
792 (1969) (hog farm in area annexed by city); Seifert v. Dillon, 83 Neb. 322, 119
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are, however, a number of courts that have held that, while "coming
to the nuisance" is not a complete defense, priority of occupancy
is a factor which the court should consider in reaching its decision.'
In most cases where the defense of "coming to the nuisance"
has been rejected, the activity alleged to be a nuisance existed for
some time without causing any offense, but is found to be in the
path of natural residential growth or commercial development. 62 In
requiring the "nuisance" to move or close down, the court is recognizing that to rule otherwise "would preclude development. In the march
are in the way . . . must yield
of progress, private interests [which]
63
community."
the
of
good
to the
Courts which reject "coming to the nuisance" as a defense also
recognize that a contrary rule would allow an individual to commence the operation of an offensive use in an uninhabited area and
thereby condemn large surrounding areas of land to perpetually endure
the effects of the offensive use .6 An individual could, through the
maintenance of an offensive use, permanently reduce the value of
surrounding land, since a purchaser likely would pay less for property burdened by the effects of a nearby nuisance than for property
free from such a burden. 6 '
Those courts which have continued to recognize "coming to the
nuisance" as a defense have usually done so to protect the interests
of "industrial operators who are a part of a long-established and
recognized industrial center, [in an] area . . . dominated by manufacturing enterprises, ...from claims [by new homeowners] who have
66
voluntarily . . . established their habitations within [such] districts."
N.W. 686 (1909) (general store opened across street from bawdy house); Mahone
v. Autry, 55 N.M. 111, 227 P.2d 623 (1951) (riding academy and stables in area
which became residential); Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 32 N.Y.S. 568 (1876)
(brick yard in area which became residential); Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n.
v. Organic Fertilizer Co., 264 Ore. 557, 505 P.2d 919 (1973) (cattle feedlot in outskirts of city; area changing from agricultural to residential); Guarina v. Bogart,
407 Pa. 307, 180 A.2d 557 (1962) (drive-in theater in rural residential area); Boehm
v. Philadelphia, 59 Pa. Super. 441 (1915) (pig farm in growing city).
61. See infra notes 78 through 82 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 59.
63. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
64.
65. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (1876) (prior user cannot "control the
uses to which his neighbor's land may in the future be subjected .... and thus compel
his neighbor to leave his land vacant, or to use it in such way only as the neighboring
nuisance will allow").
246
66. East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Or. 505, __,
P.2d 554, 560 (1952). See also Oetjen v. Goff Kirby Co., 38 ABS. 117, 49 N.E.2d
95 (Ohio App. 1942) (plaintiff bought apartment building near defendant's coal yard
in industrial area); Harden Chevrolet Co. v. Pickaway Grain Co., 27 Ohio Op. 2d

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Courts have also acted to protect "nuisances" in rural or agricultural
areas from newcomers who have taken advantage of low land prices
and then tried to attempt to claim all the advantages of urban and

suburban freedom from offensive odors, noises, animals and so on.67

It is well accepted that one may acquire a prescriptive right to
interfere with another person's use and enjoyment of his property,
but it is generally held in this country that the interference must continue for a specified period of time, 68 and must be adverse to the
use and enjoyment of the neighbor's property. 9 There can be no

adverse use until there is an injury to a neighbor; thus, no prescriptive rights can be acquired while the adjoining land is vacant.7 ° Also,

there can be no prescriptive right unless the defendant uses his property in the same offensive manner and causes the same injury to the
plaintiff for the required period of time. 7 ' While it is certainly possible

144, 194 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio Com. P1. 1961) (plaintiff established his used car lot
near grain elevator in industrial area); Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc.,
15 Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942) (plaintiff bought house near cement plant which
was major industry in the town); Dolan v. Chicago, M & St. P. Ry. Co., 118 Wis.
362, 95 N.W. 385 (1903) (plaintiff moved into house near stockyards and next to
railroad station).
Of course, the doctrine of "coming to the nuisance" would not apply to persons
moving into a house near a manufacturing plant where the plant is not located in
an exclusively manufacturing district. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Ragland, 11 F.2d
231, 234 (5th Cir. 1926).
67. Spur Industries, 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (retirement community built
near cattle feedlot, 15 miles from urban area); Mahlstadt v. City of Indianola, 251
Iowa 222, 100 N.W.2d 189 (1959) (houses built in new subdivision next to city dump,
in agricultural area); Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 331 P.2d 539 (1958)
(new houses built near cattle feedlot, in agricultural area, six miles from city limits and
three miles beyond county zoning). See also Barth v. Christian Psychopathic
Hosp. Ass'n., 196 Mich. 642, 643, 163 N.W. 62, 63 (1917) (The court stated that
if people build homes near an insane asylum, they are financially compensated for
the nuisance by lower land prices, and are in "no position to appeal the conscience
of a court equity to demand that the institution ...

be abandoned." This statement

was dictum, as the asylum was about to be built in a residential area, and defendant
was met "at the threshold of his enterprise by the remonstrance of the inhabitants."
196 Mich. at 646-47, 163 N.E. at 64.
68. Campbell, 63 N.Y. at 585. An exception to this is the doctrine of prior
appropriation of water, which protects the first user. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140,
146 (1855).

69. Parker 8 Edgarton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 311 (N.Y.S. 1838). The
American courts have rejected the English doctrine of ancient lights, which grants
a prescriptive right to continue to receive light across a neighbor's land after a landowner has received that light for a certain period of time (currently 27 years). There
is no requirement that the reception of light be adverse to the neighbor's interests,
or that it interfere with the use and enjoyment of his property in any way. See The
Rights of Light Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 56, §§ 2, 3 (statute was enacted "for
the purpose of preventing the access and use of light from being taken.").
70. Gose v. Coryell, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 126 S.W. 1164 (1910).
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to acquire a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance,72 it would be
most unusual for a landowner to continuously and unreasonably interfere with his neighbor's use and enjoyment of his land for many years73
without his neighbor complaining about the nuisance. If the complaint is not made, it seems virtually certain that a plaintiff would
be barred by laches7" long before the required prescriptive period had

elapsed."

While it is generally accepted that one can acquire a prescriptive
right to continue to maintain a private nuisance, it is equally well
accepted that one cannot acquire a right to maintain a public nuisance

by prescription, 76 and that laches is not a defense where a public
nuisance is involved.77 The interests of an individual must give way

when those interests constitute a threat to the public health, safety
or welfare."8

VI.

COMING

To

THE NUISANCE

As A

FACTOR

Many courts, though refusing to recognize "coming to the
nuisance" as a complete defense, do give weight to the prior existence

of the defendant's activity or operation and accept it as a factor to
be considered in determining if his property use is unreasonable, i.e.,
in determining whether in fact a nuisance exists.79 Courts are much

more likely to give favorable treatment to an enterprise which has

become a nuisance solely because newcomers have moved to the area8"

v. Farmers Livestock Mkt., 343 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961); Ensign v. Walls,
323 Mich. 49, 34 N.W.2d 549 (1948); Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel & Supply Co., 254
Wis. 194, 36 N.W.2d 97 (1949).
72. Prijatel v. Sifco Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio Misc. 31, 353 N.E.2d 923 (1974).
73. Usually, 20 years is required for adverse possession. Campbell, 63 N.Y.
at 584; Parker, 19 Wend. at 311.
74. Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
75. Peck v. Newburgh Light, Heat & Power Co., 132 App. Div. 82,
116 N.Y.S. 433, 434 (1909) (plaintiff came to the nuisance, allowed it to continue
for a number of years, saw defendant make large outlays of money, and made no
complaint or objection).
76. Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P.2d 678 (1933); Cowin v. City of
Waterloo, 237 Iowa 202, 21 N.W.2d 705 (1946); Ryan v. Louisiana Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 221 La. 559, 59 So.2d 883 (1952) transferred to app.
ct., 62 So.2d 296 (La. App. 1953).
77. Ryan, 221 La. 559.
78. See, eg., Spur Industries, 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700.
79. E.g., McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apts., Ltd., 25 Ariz. App. 312, 543 P.2d
150 (1975); Hall v. Budde, 293 Ky. 436, 169 S.W.2d 33 (1943); Ensign v. Walls,
323 Mich. 49, 34 N.W.2d 549 (1948).
80. E.g., Hall v. Budde, 293 Ky. 436, 169 S.W.2d 33 (1943) (houses built near
hog farm in semi-rural, sparsely-settled area; injunction denied); Hartung v. County
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than they are to an offensive enterprise which moves into an area
already devoted to other uses.8" Typical of this attitude is the statement of the court in Barth v. Christian Psychopathic Hospital
Association:
There is a very marked distinction to be observed in both reason
and equity between the case of a business long established in a particular locality, which has become a nuisance from the growth of
population and the erection of dwellings in proximity to it, and that
of a new erection or business threatened in such vicinity; and it requires a much clearer case to justify a court of equity in interfering
by injunction to compel a person to remove an establishment in which
he has invested his capital and been carrying on business for a longer
period of time than would be required to prevent the establishment
of an objectionable business by one who comes into the neighborhood
proposing to establish such a business for the first time, and is met
at the threshold of his enterprise by a remonstrance of the
inhabitants83

Where the plaintiff has come to the nuisance, courts will often
refuse to grant any relief, sometimes on the theory that the plaintiff
is too sensitive, 84 or that the defendant has made all reasonable accommodations and should not be required to shut down completely, 5
or that the public interest favors the continuance of the defendant's
enterprise.86 In other cases, courts have given weight to priority of
of Milwaukee, 2 Wis. 2d 269, 87 N.W.2d 799 (1958) (as city grew, houses built

near quarry; injunction denied).
81. E.g., Helmkamp v. Clark Ready-Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974)
(cement plant built near residential area just outside city); Kriener v. Turkey Valley
Community School District, 212 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973) (school sewage lagoon built
near dairy farm in farming area); Bates v. Quality Ready Mix Co., 154 N.W.2d
852 (Iowa 1967) (ready-mix cement plant built in residential and commercial area).
82. 196 Mich. 642, 163 N.W. 62 (1917).
83. Id. at 647, 163 N.W. at 63-64.
84. E.g., Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (Mo. App. 1947)
(brewery in small town; other residents did not complain); Gose v. Coryell, 59 Tex.
Civ. App. 504, 126 S.W. 1164 (1910) (cotton gin in largely manufacturing area; plaintiff's predecessor had not objected to gin operation). Contra, Prah v. Maretti, 108
Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982) (plaintiff's house used solar heating device,
which might lose its access to sun if defendant built his house in his preferred location on his lot; court said defendant's house might constitute a nuisance to plaintiff).
85. E.g., Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (Mo. App. 1947)
(brewery had used all available devices to clean air); Patton v. Westwood Country

Club, 18 Ohio App. 2d 137, 47 Ohio Op. 2d 247, 247 N.E.2d 761 (1969) (plaintiff

built house adjoining golf course; defendant moved the fairway, planted trees, etc.,
to reduce the likelihood of golf balls being hit onto plaintiff's land; to do more
would cost too much and ruin the golf hole).
86. Miller v. Jackson, 1 Q.B. 966, 3 All E.R. 338 (1977) (plaintiff bought house
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occupation in deciding whether to deny injunctive relief and award
only damages."
Courts are more willing to protect the interests of the public
generally than to protect the interests of individual citizens or
businesses. Thus, a court may refuse to enjoin the continued operation of a city garbage dump, even though it is offensive to new
residents in the area, because the city must have a dump to serve

the needs of the public and the dump was established in an agricultural
area long before the residences existed. 88 When the roles are reversed, courts will typically enjoin the continued operation of an individual
or business enterprise whose offensive or harmful character stands
in the way of the public interest in the natural growth of a city or

town.89 Even where the defendant's enterprise is natural and appropriate to the area and would not be enjoined even though it was
offensive to new residents in the area, it will be enjoined if it represents
a threat to the public health and welfare. 9 In such a case, however,
it seems proper that the defendant should be compensated for the

cost of moving or closing down. 9
VII.

DOES

ENJOINING

CONSTITUTE

A

A

NUISANCE

"TAKING"?

"Taking" is usually thought of as a physical process when applied to real property; that is, a "taking" does not occur unless there

is a "physical" invasion of the land of another, or some "visible
physical deterioration of [the] land, or [the] loss of some right pertaining to [the] land which would be physically demonstrated, such

in new development next to cricket ground; court said public interest in open space
and recreation should prevail).
87. Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871) (injunction denied: can bring
action at law for damages); Gose v. Coryell, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 126 S.W. 1164
(1910) (must balance equities in determining remedy); Miller v. Jackson, 1 Q.B. 966,
3 All E.R. 338 (1977) (injunction denied; damages awarded).
88. Mahlstadt v. City of Indianola, 251 Iowa 222, 100 N.W.2d 189 (1959).
89. See Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (brickyard in area
later annexed to city; Court said "private interests . . .must yield to the good of
the community"); City of Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239
S.W. 724 (1922) (hide and fur business in growing city; private rights must yield
to public good); Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. 616 (1866) (cattle pens outside
town which grew from 500 people to 20,000; defendant must yield to needs of the
people); City of Lyons v. Betts, 184 Neb. 746, 171 N.W.2d.792 (1969) (hog farm
in area later annexed to city; must not jeopardize orderly growth of cities).
90. Spur Industries, 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700, 707-08 (1972).
91. Id. at 708.
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as loss of access". 9 2 Whether or not there has been a "taking" when
the continued operation of a nuisance is enjoined is a matter of great
importance. If a "taking" has occurred, and an injunction was issued
for the benefit of the public, the federal and state constitutions require that just compensation be paid. "3 Even if the injunction is entirely for the benefit of private parties, it may well be that compensation should be paid."'
There can be little question that municipalities have the right to
expand and grow, and may exercise the power of eminent domain
to extend their streets, condemn tracts of land, and provide public
utilities.9 5 It is generally held that if the state "has the right to appropriate land to public uses, [it] must necessarily have the power
to protect the public in this use."19 6 Yet, governmental bodies rarely
if ever take affirmative action to condemn, in an eminent domain
proceeding, a right of use and enjoyment of property. Rather, they
typically bring an action for an injunction to abate the nuisance, 97
or a criminal proceeding to impose sanctions,9 8 or revoke a use
permit,9 9 and leave it to the defendant to seek compensation in an
inverse condemnation action.' °° Where a public body does condemn
land, it often pays only for loss of, or damage to, the property itself,
and not for any injury to the owner's use and enjoyment of the
property.III
In some cases the landowner who is forced to shut down or move
his enterprise suffers no loss, because the new development of the
surrounding area substantially increases land values, including his

92. Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1401 (1965).
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation").
94. If we require the sovereign to pay compensation, we surely should require
no less of a private party.
95. Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. 616, 618 (1866).
96. Id.
97. Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. 616 (1866).
98. People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 46 N.W. 735 (1890);
Boehm v. Philadelphia, 59 Pa. Super. 441 (1915).
99. Mile Road Corp. v. City of Boston, 345 Mass. 379, 187 N.E.2d 826, appeal dismissed, 373 U.S. 541 (1963).
100. "Inverse condemnation" is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been "taken" in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain
has been attempted by the taking agency.
101. City of Winchester v. Ring, 312 II. 544, 144 N.E. 333 (1924) (city condemned part of farm for cemetery; defendant sought compensation for loss of value
because cemetery would be close to his house, and would have a depressing
psychological effect).
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own.' 02 Even where the landowner suffers an injury and loss of values,
it "is deemed to be damnum absque injuria-loss without injury in
the legal sense-on the theory that the property owner is compensated for the injury sustained by sharing the general benefits which
3 While it may seem uninure to all from the public improvement."'
fair to put the burden of needed public improvements and growth
on a few citizens rather than on taxpayers generally, this may be the
only approach that will work in practice. If each landowner were to
receive compensation for every injury to the use and enjoyment of
his property resulting from the growth and development of our cities
and towns, "the making of public improvements would become practhe development of communities would be
tically impossible",""4 0and
5
handicapped.'
severely
VIII.

SHOULD PRIVATE "TAKING"

BE ALLOWED?

It is unquestioned that private property can be taken for public
use, however, it is equally well accepted that a property owner "can0°
not be compelled to sell his land to private individuals". ' Yet, when
a court denies injunctive relief to the victim of a nuisance and allows
only the recovery of damages, the practical effect is the taking of
private property by "a private person or corporation for private gain
or advantage".' 0 7 Where there is no public benefit from allowing continuance of the nuisance, it seems improper "to impose [a] servitude
°
on land ... without consent of the owner"." ' A further argument
against this result is that it eliminates the incentive to correct or alleviate
the cause of the nuisance.' 9
102. See generally Barth v. Christian Psychopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 196 Mich. 642,
644, 163 N.W. 62, 63 (1917). Barth did not involve landowners coming to the nuisance.
However, the court noted that in coming to the nuisance cases, persons purchase
land surrounding nuisances to take advantage of depreciated property values. Id.
at 644, 163 N.W.2d at 63. Hence, if the nuisance is successfully abated, the value
of the nuisance property and surrounding property will appreciate.
103. Belmar Drive-In Theater Co. v. The Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n,
34 111.2d 544, 550, 216 N.E.2d 788, 792 (1966) (tollway oasis, with very bright lights,

built near outdoor theater). Other examples are "the building of fire houses, police
stations, hospitals, cemeteries and the like in close proximity to private property").
The same view has been applied where a railroad right-of-way is built under a public
grant of authority. See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
104. Aldrich v. Metropolitan West Side Elevated R.R. Co., 195 Il. 456, 464,
63 N.E. 155, 157 (1902).
105. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
106. Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. 616, 618 (1866).

107. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 230, 257 N.E.2d 870,

876, 309 N.Y.S. 2d 312, 318 (1970) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Courts, in some cases, have not only denied injunctive relief and

limited recovery to awarded damages," ' but in other cases have denied

any relief at all."' This produces a taking for private use without
compensation. The rationale for denying relief to one who "comes
to the nuisance" is that the right of action, if any, belonged to plaintiff's predecessor in title, who owned the property when the activity

or operation was initiated."' The flaw in this rationale is that the
defendant's operation may not have interfered with the use and enjoyment of the property by the prior owner of plaintiff's land, especially if the land was vacant and unoccupied. In such a case, no cause

of action would have existed at that time. The failure of plaintiff's
grantor to seek to abate the defendant's operation should not bar

a new owner of the property from seeking appropriate relief, unless

a prescriptive right has been acquired by adverse possession.
IX.

PREFERENCE: "BEST"
APPROPRIATE"

'

OR "MOST
USE?

Perhaps the most sensible solution to resolve nuisance cases is
to disregard priority of use by either party, and instead to determine
what use is the "best" or "most appropriate" for the area. If the
first user is located in an inappropriate place, he will have to relocate
when another person comes to the area with a more appropriate use.
Going back to the tanyard case considered by Blackstone,'
who
should have the rights? If the location is particularly appropriate for
tanyards (perhaps there are tanbark trees growing nearby) and particularly inappropriate for residents, the tanyard should have the rights
regardless of who was first, as it is most efficient to have tanyards
in the area. Conversely, if the area is most appropriate for residents
110. Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871) (flour mill in business and
manufacturing area; injunction denied; plaintiff can bring action at law for damages);
Miller v. Jackson, 1 Q.B. 966, 3 All E.R. 338 (1977) (houses built next to cricket
ground; injunction denied; damages awarded).
I ll. Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 15 Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942)
(injunction and damages denied; defendant's cement plant was vital factor in economy
of town; plaintiff should have known there would be some discomfort when he bought
the house). See Gau v. Ley, 27 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 1, 6 (1917) (plaintiff sought only
injunction, but court probably would not have allowed damages; plaintiffs "must
submit to such annoyances and discomforts as are fairly incidental to the [natural]
use of the area").
112. Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 15 Wash. 2d 14, 18, 129 P.2d 536,
538 (1942).
113. But see id. ("That the right of action . . . did not pass to . . . grantee
with conveyance of the property needs no citation of sustaining authority.").
114. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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(perhaps it is very scenic) and inappropriate for tanyards, the most
efficient outcome is encouraged by giving the residents the right to
a clean environment.
The "best use" approach is exemplified by Miller v. Jackson.'"
The court denied injunctive relief to a new homeowner who bought
a house in a new residential development adjoining a cricket ground.
The cricket club had played there for many years; the court found
that the cricket ground was a good and appropriate use of the land,
and that there was no other land in the area that could be used for
this purpose.
A similar example, on a somewhat larger scale, arose in Spur
Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Company."II The court indicated that in an agricultural area a cattle feedlot operation was a
more appropriate use of land than a new residential community.
Despite this finding, the court enjoined further operation of the feedlot,
to protect the public health, and required the residential developer
to compensate the feedlot operator for his loss.
It is clear that the court in Spur Industries recognized that it
would be inequitable to allow a residential developer to suddenly buy
land at low cost in an inappropriate area without compensating an
7
appropriate user who was thereby dispossessed." It could reasonably be argued that reimbursement should also be required when a
previously inoffensive operation becomes a nuisance because the area
is changing. In such a situation that which had been an appropriate
2°
use, no longer is. Thus, when a brickyard,' 8 cattle feedlot,' '9 or piggery'
has operated for many years, only to be overrun by the influx of new
homes, it seems unfair to put the entire burden of moving on the
newly-designated nuisance, even though the "best" and "most appropriate" use of the area is now residential. Yet, courts routinely
enjoin continued operation of the nuisance, and seemingly give little
thought to defendant's loss, apparently feeling that the defendant must
115. 1 Q.B. 966, 3 All E.R. 338 (1977).
116. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
117. Webb purchased 20,000 acres at a cost of $750 per acre. At that time,
land around the perimeter of Phoenix (about 15 miles away) cost approximately $2,000
per acre. Id. at 182, 494 P.2d at 704. See also Comment, Plaintiff Required to Indemnify Defendant for Losses Resulting From Permanent Injunction in a Nuisance
Case: Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 1973 UTAH L. REv.
55, 68-69 & n.78 (he who seeks equity must do equity).
118. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
119. Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer, 264 Ore. 557,
505 P.2d 919 (1972).
120. Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
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suffer for the good of the public generally.' 2 ' Implicit in this view
is a recognition of the difficulty in determining who should compensate defendant for his loss, when the benefit from abating the nuisance
will inure to many new residents, in unequal proportions, rather than
to one large developer.
Failure to compensate the prior possessor, whose operation has
become a nuisance, for the cost of modifying, moving or terminating
his operation may result in unjust enrichment' 2 2 of the new occupants
of the neighboring land. In many cases new occupants will have purchased property at prices much lower than they would have paid in
an established area.' 23 If they can force the prior occupant to move,
the value of their land will be substantially enhanced. Requiring compensation would deter people from moving into areas better suited
to other uses, or would at least encourage them to buy enough land
to provide a buffer zone between the existing operations in the area
and the more sensitive uses of the new occupants. 2 "
X.

ULTRA-SENSITIVE USE

By

PRIOR OCCUPANT

A situation analogous to "coming to the nuisance" arises when
the first occupant has an ultra-sensitive use which is interfered with
by a subsequent occupant's natural or normal use. This has arisen
in several cases involving light; for example, where an addition to
one hotel blocked sun light from the swimming pool at an adjacent
hotel,' 2 5 or where the lights at a tollway oasis turned night into day
at an adjoining drive-in theater.' 26 The courts have held that the occupant with the unusually sensitive use cannot be heard to complain
if the new occupant uses his land in a way which would not interfere
with the use and enjoyment of a normal landowner in the area.' 2 7
121.

Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brick yard owner did not

seek compensation for reduction in value of his property resulting from termination
of his operation, but court said development of city should not be interfered with).
Cf., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963) (court seemed to
sympathize with defendant, but apparently felt it was better to make him move so
the area could be used for houses).
122. "A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is

required to make restitution to the other." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
123. See, e.g., supra note 116.
124. Of course, it can be argued that this "might make 'progress' prohibitively
expensive". Note, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 55, 74, supra note 116.
125. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five, Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So.2d
357
(Fla. App. 1959).

126. Belmar Drive-In Theater Co. v. Illinois St. Toll Hwy. Comm'n., 34 Ill.

2d 544, 216 N.E.2d 788 (1966).

127. The same result has been reached where the sensitive user moved to the
area after the alleged nuisance was in operation. East St. Johns Shingle Co., Inc.
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The possibility of a change in this long-standing principle may be
found in Prah v. Maretti,'" where the court held that a person building
a new house may create a nuisance if he locates the house on his
land in such a way as to block a neighbor's access to the sun for
use in the neighbor's solar heating system. If this view should gain
acceptance, it would represent a sharp departure from the long-standing
rule in this country that there is no right of access to light across
the adjoining land of another.' 2 9
Requiring no accommodation for a neighbor's ultra-sensitive or
unusual use of his property poses some difficult problems. Using access to sun for energy purposes as an example,' 30 how much light
must be guaranteed? If a solar user is assured of all the light he desires,
this may impose severe limitations on his neighbors' use of their property, and may also eliminate the incentive to install the most efficient
energy device.' 3 ' Other solutions might be to set some arbitrary level
of guaranteed light, as is done under the English Right of Light Act,' 3 2
or simply give priority of right to the first user,' 33 as is done with
4

water -rights in the western states.' 3

In most cases which have involved access to sunlight, the party
seeking access wanted the sunlight for aesthetic or illuminative
purposes,' 3 rather than to provide a source of energy. As the court
pointed in in Prah,136 it is relatively easy and inexpensive to use artificial light for illumination, and aesthetic value was considered
v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 246 P.2d 554 (1952) (city had dumped sewage
into slough for years; plaintiffs knew this when they bought the land along slough
but then complained that sewage contaminated the logs used to make shingles; other
businesses along the slough were not bothered by the sewage).
128. 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
129. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five, Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So.2d 357
(Fla. App. 1959); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y.S. 1838). The American courts
have uniformly rejected the English doctrine of ancient lights, which allows a landowner to acquire a prescriptive right to access to light. See Prah v. Maretti, 108
Wis. 2d 233, 233, 321 N.W.2d 182, 188 (1982); Note, The Allocation of Sunlight:
Solar Rights and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 421, 430
(1976). See also William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611) (damages allowed
for obstruction of light by pig sty built along lot line, two feet from plaintiff's house).
130. In the not too distant future this may come to be considered a normal
and ordinary need of a homeowner. See Note, Prah v. Maretti: Solar Rights and
Private Nuisance Law, 16 J. MAR. L. REV. 435, 448 & n.75 (1983).
131. Note, supra note 128.
132. The Right of Light Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 56.
133. This approach has been adopted in New Mexico. Solar Rights Act, ch.
169, 1977 N.M. LAWS 544.
134. Williams, Solar Access and Property Rights.: A Maverick Analysis, 11 CONN.

L.

REV.

430, 447 & n.46.

135. E.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five, Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So.2d
357 (Fla. App. 1959) (sun for hotel guests at pool and beach).
136. Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
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minimal.' 37 However, where access to sunlight is sought to provide
energy, the public interest in finding and using alternative sources
38
of energy becomes an important factor.' It may be desirable to require
a balancing of the competing interests, rather than applying an absolute
rule of denying any right of access to sunlight.'
If the law is to provide some right of access to sunlight, compensation should be paid by the receiver of sunlight to the neighbor whose
property use is being restricted. If one is forced to build his house
in a less desirable place, or to limit its height or size, there is unquestionably a reduction in the value of the right of use and enjoyment
of the property. In fact, it is just this reasoning that has led most
courts to refuse to enjoin or restrict a use of property which is reasonable and normal, even though that use may cause problems for a
neighbor.' 0 After all, is it so unreasonable to expect a person needing
access to sunlight to locate his own house in an advantageous place
where the sunlight cannot be blocked out, or to buy sufficient adjoining property to assure his access, or to buy an easement of access'"
from his neighbors?'" 2
XI.

CONCLUSION

Conflicting uses of land will present difficult questions for many
years to come, and courts will have to grapple with and attempt to
resolve these problems. It will be necessary to re-think and re-evaluate
some of the principles and guidelines that have been applied in the
past. As the goals and attitudes of society change, so too must the
rules we use in deciding nuisance cases.

137. Id. at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 238, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
140. See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five, Twenty-Five, Inc., 114
So.2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959).
141. By means of a set-back, height restriction, etc.
142. Prah, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 247, 321 N.W.2d 182, 194 (Callow, J., dissenting).

